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Direct Democracy and Minority
Rights: Direct and Indirect Effects on
Religious Minorities in Switzerland
Anna Christmann and Deniz Danaci
University of Zurich
Abstract: Most of the research on the effects of direct democracy on minority
rights is empirically limited to the direct effects of direct democracy. This
article takes the issue a step further and examines both direct and indirect
effects by investigating the rights of religious minorities in Switzerland. The
analysis provides two main insights: all direct effects are negative and can be
observed when the rights of out-groups like Islamic minorities are at stake.
Second, indirect effects on the parliamentary process can be observed, too:
parliaments make laws more restrictive toward Islamic minorities if they fear a
popular vote. However, they develop strategies to enforce their liberal
interests, as shown by the fact that extensions of the rights of religious
minorities are passed in total revisions.
1. INTRODUCTION
Popular votes generally promote pure majority rule1 and are therefore
often suspected of threatening minority rights (Matsusaka 2004, 115).
Thus, over the past decade, several researchers have tried to prove or dis-
prove the assumption that minority groups suffer at the polls. The present
article connects to these previous studies, but aims at a more comprehen-
sive view of the effects of direct democracy on a specific group of
minorities.
Many of the previous analyses simply counted the relevant popular votes
that affected minority rights in Switzerland or in California— the two states
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(respectively member states) with the most frequent use of direct democratic
instruments (Gamble 1997; Frey and Goette 1998)— and produced ambig-
uous results. In California, popular votes seem to endanger minority rights
(Gamble 1997; Donovan and Bowler 1998; see also Haider-Markel,
Querze, and Lindaman 2007), whereas in Switzerland no such effects
could be detected (Frey and Goette 1998; Bolliger 2007). The main short-
comings of most of these studies are that comparisons with the represen-
tative arena are absent and indirect effects of direct democracy are
disregarded. While popular votes have direct effects on policy if they
change the status quo or, conversely, inhibit change, they can also have
indirect effects on policy by influencing the decisions made by govern-
ment and parliament.
Furthermore, Gerber (1996), Gerber and Hug (2001), Hug (2004) as
well as Bolliger (2007) suggest that the effects of direct democracy on
minority rights cannot be generalized since it is necessary to differentiate
between minority groups and their degree of integration in society. They
point out that the adjustment of parliamentary outputs to voters’ prefer-
ences is the most important indirect effect of direct democracy, and that,
furthermore, the existence of direct democratic instruments in a political
system will only lead to negative effects for a minority group if that
group is unpopular. This article attempts to take these considerations
into account by distinguishing between in-group and out-group minorities.
In order to do this adequately, we focus on religious minorities as a
very specific group of minorities. Previous studies have often included a
variety of different minority categories that could hardly be compared to
each other (Gamble 1997; Frey and Goette 1998). An additional consider-
ation is that religious issues have regained political salience. For many
decades, permanent immigration has increased the number of religious
communities and the size of Muslim minorities in Western societies in
particular, resulting in struggles about cultural values and orientation
(Cesari 2004; Bowen 2007; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Helbling
2010; Altermatt, Delgado, and Vergauwen 2006). As a consequence, a
number of conflicts have arisen over the legal situation of these foreign
religious communities. Governments need to develop ways of dealing
with this new situation, and as a semi-direct democracy, Switzerland
faces special challenges since politicians do not only have to decide on
how to integrate foreign religions, but also have to find popular support
for their propositions.
As issues concerning churches and other religious groups fall under the
competencies of the Swiss member states (called cantons) rather than the
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federation (Rutz 2000), we therefore focus on the rights of religious min-
orities in the Swiss cantons. Switzerland generally is a useful “laboratory”
for comparative analyses of the effects of direct democracy: while the
cantons differ a lot with respect to attributes like the party system, they
are very similar to one another with respect to other variables, which
facilitates empirical analyses.
To summarize, this article focuses on whether direct democratic
instruments lead to more liberal or more restrictive regulations for religious
communities, and whether the effect of direct democracy varies across
different religious groups. In order to shed light on these research questions,
we look at both the direct democratic and the parliamentary arena. Direct
effects occur in the former and indirect effects in the latter. With this
two-fold analysis, we aim to improve the analysis of the effects of direct
democracy that have so far suffered from the outlined shortcomings —
especially when it comes to minority issues.
The study is structured as follows. In the next section, the theoretical
framework is presented and several hypotheses are derived from it. This
is followed by a short overview of religious groups and the state-religion
relationship in Switzerland. The third section focuses on empirical data.
Direct effects of direct democracy will be analyzed by examining all
popular votes that legally affected religious minorities, whereas indirect
effects will be explored by investigating legislative processes. Finally,
we will summarize our findings and present our conclusions.
2. THEORY
Two theoretical approaches are fundamental to our analyses: the difference
between direct and indirect effects of direct democracy on the one hand,
and the distinction between different types of minority categories on the
other. These two distinctions will be explained in greater detail below;
subsequently, differences across the cantons will be discussed.
2.2. Direct and Indirect Effects of Direct Democracy on
Minority Rights
By definition, effects of direct democracy occur when a given policy output
is different from what it would be if there were no direct democratic instru-
ments (see Gerber and Hug 2001). Direct effects of direct democracy come
about if the voters refuse a legislators’ proposition in a referendum or
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approve a popular initiative. There is no effect if people approve a referen-
dum, because in that case the outcome does not differ from the outcome of
the legislative process. To isolate indirect effects, one has to look at the leg-
islative process. If the legislator passes a law that departs from its ideal
outcome, but is closer to the median voter’s position, indirect effects
occur (Gerber 1996). These different kinds of effects can be seen in
Table 1. It shows that effects — no matter whether direct or indirect —
occur only if the legislator’s preferences are different from the voters’ prefer-
ences concerning a particular measure. But why should the preferences of
the legislator regarding the rights of religious minorities differ from those
of the electorate? Even though not many empirical studies exist on this
issue, a number of theories have been advanced explaining why parliamen-
tary decisions are more in favor of minority rights than popular votes. The
following three arguments are most commonly put forward to explain the
different outcome and different preferences.
First, parliamentary processes are regarded as more deliberative than
election campaigns. They have more discursive filters, such as commis-
sions or special hearings that include in-depth debates and a broad
exchange of information and arguments (Gamble 1997, 247; Bolliger
2007, 424). Deliberation also includes the possibility of deals and logrolling
(Clark 1998, 456 and seq.; Tullock 1970). These deliberative discussions
provide more opportunities for minorities to bring their interests into the
legislative process. Small groups may be able to achieve their goals at
least in part by negotiating about packages. These negotiations are not poss-
ible in a popular vote where voters can only approve or reject a measure.
Second, popular votes are anonymous. Voters do not have to justify
their decisions; nobody has to say how he or she voted, and why. This is
significantly different from politicians who are to a certain extent com-
pelled to account for their decisions. If voters also had to explain their
voting behavior to the public, they might come to different decisions
from those taken in a secret vote (Papadopoulos 1998, 177).
Table 1. Direct and indirect effects
Instrument Effect if No effect if
Direct Effects Mandatory/ Optional
Referendum
Law is rejected Law is approved
Popular Initiative Law is approved Law is rejected
Indirect Effects – Law is closer to the
median voters’ ideal
point
Law is at legislator’s
ideal point
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Finally, preferences per se might differ between politicians and voters.
Compared to the political elite, citizens are less educated and less involved
in international relations. Both facts lead to a less liberal attitude toward
cultural diversity and policy change (Marcus et al. 1995; Sniderman and
Hagendoorn 2007, 105–106; Widmer 2003, 19). This assumption also
appears in the United States debate about the outcome of direct democracy
(Ranney 1978, 84; Smith and Tatalovich 2003, 176).
These three arguments imply that voters decide more restrictively on
minority rights than parliaments. This is in line with the findings of a
number of legal scholars who point out that counter-majoritarian filters
are needed in a democracy to protect minorities, and that these filters
are almost completely absent in popular votes (Eule 1990, 1525;
Niblock 1993, 179). Thus, minority rights might fare better in representa-
tive than in direct democracy.
However, there might be a mechanism to avoid negative effects on min-
orities even though the electorate is conservative. There are two possible
strategies for representatives to pass a law in spite of an impending popular
vote: “softening a law,” that is, giving in to the pressure of direct democ-
racy, or avoiding a popular campaign that focuses on the sensitive issue.
Kriesi (2005, 313) showed that such campaigns have a disproportionately
strong mobilization effect on opponents of a given piece of legislation.
Thus, politicians may try to redirect the public debate to other issues by
embedding the sensitive one in a broad bill, e.g., in a total revision of a
cantonal constitution. The first strategy, as Gerber and Hug (2001)
noted, is an adoption of the opinion of the median voter. The second strat-
egy enables politicians to implement their own policy preferences by
bundling several issues together, resulting in a multidimensional bill.
This, in turn, minimizes the risk of the sensitive issue being focused on
in the campaign (Besley and Coate 2008). In other words, we assume
that the negative indirect effects of direct democracy on minority rights
can be minimized by embedding a sensitive piece of legislation into a
broader bill, such as a total revision of the constitution.
2.3. Different Types of Religious Minorities in Switzerland
The effects of direct democracy depend on the relative preferences of the
parliament and the median voter (Gerber 1996). We assume that the pre-
ference gap between the two actors and, hence, the strength of the negative
impact of direct democracy is not equal across all minorities. Social
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identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) posits that humans are social
animals in that they identify with certain groups or categories called in-
groups. Social identities are motivated by a desire for assimilation and
conformity, which logically entails a desire for distinction from other
groups and categories which are called out-groups (Brewer and Silver
2000). Within-group differences are attenuated and between-group differ-
ences exaggerated. Moreover, humans tend to favor their in-groups at the
costs of other groups (Tajfel and Turner 1979). In other words, not iden-
tifying with a group can lead to discriminatory behavior (Gibson and
Gouws 2000; Weldon 2006).
Which of the Swiss religious minorities are out-groups, then? Figure 1
provides an overview of the most important religious categories in
Switzerland. Catholics and Protestants constitute still by far the largest
communities, although their membership numbers have decreased the
most since 1970. Smaller Christian communities (like the Christ-
Catholic church) and the Jewish communities have declined as well,
whereas Islamic communities have experienced a strong increase in mem-
bership over the past few decades. To complete the picture, the number of
people living in Switzerland without any religious affiliation — the third
largest group — is added in Figure 1.2 While Jews, Muslims, and small
Christian communities are a minority in all cantons, the minority/majority
status of Catholics and Protestants varies across the Swiss member states.
For reasons of simplicity, we distinguish only between Christians, Jews,
and Muslims for the following analyses. Since there are no time series
data available to determine the aggregate identity with the three categories,
we have to rely on a much cruder criterion. Out-groups are therefore oper-
ationalized as those minorities whose members usually do not have a
Swiss passport and thus do not belong to the “Swiss nation” (see
Helbling 2008, 28 and seq.). According to the data from the Swiss
Federal Statistical Office, only Muslims meet this condition. We therefore
assume that negative effects of direct democracy occur first and foremost
when a given policy is intended to affect Muslims.
2.4. Differences in Parliament and Voter Preferences
across Cantons
We have seen that preferences are important concerning the effect of direct
democracy. Thus, we also have to account for parliament and voter prefer-
ences that differ across cantons.
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Beginning with the electorate, there are member states with relatively
liberal as well as conservative median voters, as the results of popular
votes and elections show (Linder, Zürcher, and Bolliger 2008). As afore-
mentioned, a popular vote on the rights of Muslims is presumably better
supported by a liberal than a conservative electorate.3 As a consequence,
we expect negative direct effects of direct democracy to occur if (1) the bill
legally affects the rights of Muslims and if (2) the electorate is conserva-
tive. Both conditions need to be simultaneously met.
Turning to the parliaments, negative indirect effects are also expected to
mainly occur regarding bills that affect Muslims. In the previous para-
graph, we discussed the strategy to avoid a popular vote on a sensitive
issue by embedding it in a broad bill. Whether politicians choose such
a strategy depends on how far their preferences diverge from the voters’
preferences. If a strong party within the parliament is close to the
voters’ preferences, it might try to urge the “softening a law” strategy
instead of trying to hide a critical law in a broader bill. Additionally,
“softening a law” might be a successful campaigning strategy for a
specific party. It can show its supporters that it achieved a policy
change in their favor — maybe even against the other parties.
FIGURE 1. Membership numbers for religious communities in Switzerland (in
millions, BfS 2005).
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2.5. Hypotheses
To sum up, negative effects of direct democracy are hypothesized to affect
Muslims, only. Jews and Christians, by contrast, are expected to fare well
in both representative and direct democracy. However, the direct negative
effects on Muslims are expected to be limited to the cantons with a more
conservative electorate. In cantons with liberal voters, Muslim rights
should be protected in both types of democracy. Regarding indirect
effects, legislators might be able to avoid negative effects on Muslims
by embedding a critical law in a broader ballot measure.
Figure 2 summarizes the outlined hypotheses in a spatial model inspired
by Gerber (1996). The upper graph shows the expected effects of direct
democracy for out-group minorities. The parliament’s ideal point is more
liberal; the median voter has a restrictive attitude. If the parliament proposes
L1, a direct effect is most likely to occur; the voters will refuse the prop-
osition. Only a strategic hiding of L1 in a broader bill might be an alternative.
Otherwise, the parliament has to propose L2 to get the voters’ approval— an
indirect effect occurs. It can also be seen that the strength of the effect depends
on voter and parliament preferences. The lower graph shows the situation for
in-group minorities. As parliament and voter preferences are expected to be
the same, direct democracy has no effects. PI1 and PI2 add the possibility
to launch an initiative. In the upper graph, such an initiative is likely to be
approved if it is between any L and the position of the median voter —
that would be a direct effect. In the lower graph no such initiative should
be successful — no effect occurs.
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
In the present section, we will test the proposed hypotheses. By analyzing
popular votes as well as legislative processes concerning rights of religious
minorities in the Swiss cantons, we will try to identify direct and indirect
effects of direct democracy on minority rights. First, more information on
the rights of religious minorities in Swiss cantons will be given. Then,
direct and indirect effects will be detected in two different steps.
3.1. State-Church Relationship
To clarify which kind of political processes are being analyzed in the
empirical section, we need to add a few comments on the relationship
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between religious groups and the state in Switzerland in general. On the
whole, Switzerland has a cooperative State-Church relationship where reli-
gious communities can be recognized legally by the state. This recognition
guarantees specific rights, such as the right to teach at public schools, to
raise taxes, or to free access to demographic data. Furthermore, recog-
nition generally entails some duties, such as a democratic self-organization
in most cases (Cattacin et al. 2003, 16).
As mentioned in the Introduction, the specific relationship between the
state and religious communities differs across the cantons (article 74,
paragraph 1 federal constitution; Rutz 2000). The religious majority in
all of the 26 Swiss cantons is one of the two large Christian denomina-
tions, either the Roman-Catholic or the Evangelical-Protestant Church,
which are equally recognized by the state in every canton. Only
Geneva and Neuchâtel feature a rather laical model; they officially recog-
nize the two large denominations, but in contrast to most other cantons,
those churches are regulated by private instead of public law. Besides
the two large Christian denominations, Jewish groups are recognized in
eight cantons, and the Christ-Catholic Church in 11 cantons. As there
are no further recognized religious groups, Swiss cantons have a rather
restrictive attitude toward small religious communities compared to
their German-speaking neighbors. Germany also recognizes Jehovah’s
Witnesses, Austria recognizes Muslims, Buddhists, and Mormons
(Pahud de Mortanges 1998, 23). However, there have been some attempts
on part of the cantons to extend this legal recognition to other religious
groups. These political processes are empirically analyzed in the follow-
ing sections.
FIGURE 2. Preference Configurations concerning in- and out-groups.
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3.2. Direct Effects: Religious Minorities in popular votes
3.2.1. Case Selection
For the analysis of direct effects, all popular votes that legally affected the
rights of religious minorities in the Swiss cantons were identified. We
selected a given bill if religious minorities (e.g., “the Jewish
Community of Berne”) or globally (e.g., “religious minorities not recog-
nized by the state so far”) were explicitly named. On the basis of these
criteria, 34 relevant popular votes that took place between 1963 and
20074 were identified. Nineteen were total revisions of the cantonal con-
stitutions. The rest consists of three optional and 12 mandatory referen-
dums (no initiatives took place). All these bills intended to expand the
rights of religious minorities by recognizing them or providing the possi-
bility of recognition by the state.5 None tried to restrain them.6
3.2.2. Research Design
To detect direct effects of direct democracy, the research design is straight-
forward. If one of the bills, of which all were proposed by the government
or parliament, is rejected by the voters, there is a negative effect. If a bill is
approved, there is no effect, since the parliamentary output is not altered. In
order to determine whether there is a relationship between negative effects
and the legal recognition of Muslim minorities, all bills that included the
extension of the rights of Muslims were identified. Since we expect that
bills that concern the rights of Muslim minorities are more likely to be
rejected if the electorate is conservative, we need to find an appropriate pre-
ference measure. We chose the share of votes all parties at the extreme right
as well as the Swiss Popular Party (SVP) gained in the cantonal election,
which is closest to when the popular vote took place.7 The SVP is the
largest right-wing populist party in Switzerland today (Kriesi et al. 2005)
and stands for defending traditional values and restrictive immigration
rules (Lachat 2008; Bornschier and Helbling 2005, 34). After an overview
of all votes and some bivariate analyses, we present a short summary of
some case studies in order to underline our theoretical argument.
3.2.3. Results
Table 2 provides an overview of the identified referendums and variables.
First, we can see that only five out of 34 bills were rejected, that is, in five
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Table 2. Popular votes on minority rights 1963–2007
Canton Year
Bill includes Muslim
minorities
Elite mobilizes against
Muslims
Share of yes-
votes (%)
Turnout
(%) Institution
SVP, EDU,
SD
1 Zurich 1963 61.8 50.7 mand. 18.9
2 Nidwalden 1965 x Approved in Town Meeting total rev. 0.0
3 Obwalden 1968 x Approved in Town Meeting total rev. 0.0
4 Schaffhausen 1968 61.3 78.4 mand. 21.2
5 Waadt 1970 53.1 25.4 mand. 7.2
6 Basel-City 1972 67.3 54.5 mand. 8.7
7 Vallais 1974 x 58.5 22.6 mand. 0.0
8 Ticino 1975 x 89.5 60.6 mand. 11.1
9 Jura 1977 x 82.1 79.7 total rev. 2.8
10 Berne 1979 x 66.2 19.1 mand. 40.0
11 Aargau 1980 x 65.8 20.4 total rev. 19.2
12 Fribourg 1982 x 72.7 35.7 mand. 6.5
13 Zurich 1982 x (foreigners) 46.9 31.3 mand. 21.0
14 Schaffhausen 1983 56.1 70.6 mand. 22.8
15 Basel-City 1984 x 50.4 22.0 total rev. 5.7
16 Fribourg 1986 x 48.4 34.0 opt. 7.8
17 Solothurn 1986 x 70.0 28.7 total rev. 0.5
18 Glarus 1988 x Approved in Town Meeting total rev. 26.6
19 Basel-
Country
1989 74.9 32.1 mand. 19.0
20 Zurich 1989 52.3 25.9 mand. 24.7
21 Berne 1990 x x 39.5 15.8 opt. 36.5
22 Berne 1993 77.8 50.2 total rev. 37.8
23 Appenzell-A. 1995 x Approved in Town Meeting total rev. 30.9
24 Neuchâtel 2000 x 76.6 40.8 total rev. 0.3
25 Schaffhausen 2001 x 44.1 68.9 total rev. 33.6
Continued
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Table 2. Continued
Canton Year Bill includes Muslim
minorities
Elite mobilizes against
Muslims
Share of yes-
votes (%)
Turnout
(%)
Institution SVP, EDU,
SD
26 St Gallen 2001 71.8 41.2 total rev. 23.0
27 Schaffhouse 2002 x 50.1 64.2 total rev. 33.6
28 Vaud 2002 55.9 44.4 total rev. 12.6
29 Graubunden 2003 x 66.7 37.5 total rev. 35.7
30 Zurich 2003 x x 39.5 40.4 opt. 33.9
31 Fribourg 2004 x 58.0 49.4 total rev. 16.6
32 Basel-City 2005 x 76.5 34.5 total rev. 15.7
33 Zurich 2005 64.2 36.9 total rev. 33.9
34 Lucerne 2007 x 63.8 34.3 total rev. 18.2
Notes: mandatory referendum (mand.); optional referendum (opt.). In Nidwalden 1965, Obwalden 1968, Glarus 1988, and Appenzell-Ausserrhoden 1995 the bill
was decided on in town meetings where the votes are not counted but assessed by sight.
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cases negative effects of direct democracy are observable, which seems to
be a rather low number. Twenty-three bills implicitly included the exten-
sion of the rights of Muslims. We assumed that negative effects occur only
in these cases. Indeed, all the rejected bills provide the possibility for any
religious community — including Muslims — to become recognized by
the state under certain conditions. However, 18 other bills include this pro-
vision as well, but were not rejected. Thus, Muslim minorities per se do
not seem to be victims of direct democracy. We further specified that
negative direct effects on the rights of Muslims are more likely to occur
if the electorate is somewhat conservative. A bivariate correlation
between the outcome of the popular vote (1= approved; 0 = rejected)
and the strength of the right-wing parties including the 23 cases legally
affecting the rights of Muslim minorities turns out to be moderately
strong and negative, as model 1a in Table 3 shows.
The profile of the SVP has become right-wing populist only from the
1980s on (Kriesi et al. 2005). Therefore, the SVP’s share of the vote
can only be considered an appropriate indicator of conservatism to a
limited extent before that time. In addition, Muslim minorities were
hardly perceived as such before the 1980s, they were rather seen as immi-
grants who came to Switzerland for work (see Kepel 2006). Thus, a bill
implicitly expanding the rights of Muslims did probably not polarize to
a great extent because Muslims did not polarize, either. As a consequence,
the correlation might be stronger if we exclude the observations before the
1980s. However, in model 1b, Pearsons’s r is even lower. When we
conduct the analysis shown in models 1a and 1b with the share of
voters who approved the bill instead of the dichotomous outcome of the
vote, the correlations are much higher and significant, and the difference
between the two coefficients is as we expected (models 1c and 1d). Taking
the share of voters supporting a bill as the dependent variable requires also
Table 3. Bivariate correlations between the outcome of the vote and the
electorates’ conservatism
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d Model 1e
SVP −0.32 −0.28 −0.56* −0.67** −0.39
N 23 17 19 15 22
Notes: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; p < 0.001. Outcome is dichotomous in models 1a and 1b and
continuous in models 1c, 1d, and 1e. Models 1c to 1e do not include the cases Nidwalden 1965,
Obwalden 1968, Glarus 1988, and Appenzell-Ausserrhoden 1995 because the bill was decided on
in town meetings.
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the inclusion of the bills not affecting Muslim minorities because the cor-
relation with the right-wing parties’ share might be high in that sub-sample
as well. This, in turn, would not meet our expectations. Model 1e includes
all bills since 1980 showing that the correlation is substantially lower than
in model 1d which supports our hypotheses.
Table 2 and the bivariate analyses yield empirical evidence in favor of
our expectations, but they do not tell us whether Muslim minorities were
really the cause of the rejection of the five bills. We therefore reviewed all
newspaper articles that were published with respect with respect to the five
rejected referendums.8 Since a close relationship between the arguments of
the political parties and the arguments of their voters has been shown to
exist in a direct democratic vote (Selb et al. 2009; Milic 2008), we
assume that public opinion tells us something not only about the
parties, but also about their voters. Muslim minorities were mobilized
against only in two out of the 34 referendums — both bills were rejected.
In the 1990 vote in Berne, members of the extreme rightist party
Eidgenössisch Demokratische Union (EDU) characterized Islam as a
dangerous heresy and dominated the media coverage. In Zurich 2003,
the right-wing populist party SVP (Schweizerische Volkspartei) was in
charge of the opposition; one of the most prominent slogans was
“Taxes for Koran schools?”
A third referendum that was disapproved because a right-wing party
mobilized against the measure took place in Zurich in 1982. In this
case, the SVP mobilized against foreigners, another typical out-group.
This was because besides the possibility of recognition of any religious
group, voters also had to decide on a recognized religious community’s
right to determine who of its members was to have the right to vote on
internal matters. Also foreigners could therefore be given the right to
vote, even if only within their own religious communities, which was
not accepted by the populist SVP and some of the centrist parties —
especially if non-indigenous religious communities could be recognized
by the state in the future. They argued that this novelty might be mistaken
as a signal for the extension of political rights to immigrants. Moreover,
the Church was said to have substantial political influence that should
be limited to Swiss citizens.
In the campaigns preceding the other 28 referendums, out-group min-
orities such as Muslims and foreigners were not a salient topic at all. The
two other rejections in Fribourg 1986 and Schaffhausen 2001 had different
reasons. In Fribourg, an optional referendum took place because of detailed
regulations concerning priest’s offices. In Schaffhausen, the total revision
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of the cantonal constitution was rejected because of various reasons that did
not include any attention for the recognition rules of religious communities.
For instance, voters feared a weakening of direct democracy in the canton
and opposed regulations concerning the merger of some municipalities.
These details support our hypotheses that direct democracy has a restric-
tive effect if out-groups are perceived as being affected by the votes, as
was the case in Zurich in 1982 and 2003, and in Berne in 1990. All
measures that were accepted by a majority of voters had no previous
public debate about out-group minorities such as Muslims or foreigners.
The measures in Fribourg and Schaffhausen were rejected for different
reasons, not related to the extension of rights for religious communities.
3.3. Indirect Effects: Rules for Recognition of Religious
Minorities in Parliamentary Debates
To find indirect effects, we look at the outcome of the legislative process
and whether it has been influenced by the threat of a popular vote. Gerber
(1996) detected indirect effects by comparing voters’ preferences to legis-
lative output. This is not possible for the present case, as no surveys
regarding the specific question of the rights of religious minorities exist.
Moreover, it might be even more decisive how parliament perceives the
median voter’s position than its exact preference. Thus, indirect effects
will be detected by looking for references to the threat of a referendum
in the parliamentary debate. Indirect effects occurred if we find that recog-
nition rules for religious minorities are systematically more restrictive if
the threat of a referendum has been discussed in parliament. If recognition
rules that are introduced within a broader bill are more liberal, parliament
has probably felt less restricted by the median voter’s position in such
cases.
As also mentioned before, the strength of right-wing populist parties
like the SVP might influence the implementation of liberal recognition
rules in the parliamentary process. They strive for restrictive policies on
foreigners and immigration and attempt to uphold traditional values
(Kriesi et al. 2008; Kitschelt 1998, 20; Kailitz 2006, 312). Therefore, it
can be expected that strong right-wing parties lead to restrictive rules on
recognition.
We still expect that indirect effects will primarily occur if out-groups
such as Muslim minorities are affected. With respect to Jewish minorities,
representatives from all factions usually argue that the Jewish religion has
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the same cultural and historical roots as the Christian denominations, and
therefore has to be recognized legally. Controversial discussions only
occur if Members of Parliament (MPs) fear that recognition of a Jewish
community could lead to further recognitions of other religious commu-
nities, which do not have a similar cultural background (as mentioned
in a parliamentary discussion in St. Gallen, June 15, 1992). If, on the
other hand, Muslims minorities are concerned, we expect negative
effects of direct democracy to occur.
All these variables can interact with each other. In a vote on a total revi-
sion, both the strength of the SVP and whether or not Muslim minorities
are affected become less important factors, since the probability that voters
base their decision on the rules for religious minorities is comparatively
low. Moreover, the effect of an impending referendum, that is, indirect
effects of direct democracy should appear primarily if Muslim minorities
are mentioned in the parliamentary debate and/or if right-wing parties are
strong.
3.3.1. Research Design
Thirteen parliamentary debates concerning the official recognition of reli-
gious communities by the Swiss cantons shall be explored. Eleven of them
have already been marked in Table 2 (gray). The remaining two were not
analyzed in the first empirical part because they were not subjected to a
popular vote. In Schwyz and Basel-Land, only the parliament discussed
the new rules for recognition, no referendum was launched against their
decision afterward. Due to availability of parliamentary protocols, and
because every canton is included only once, we have significantly less
cases compared to the first empirical part. Since parliamentary processes
are hard to cut into pieces because they continue if a law fails at the
polls, the unit of analysis is the legislative process concerning recognition
rules for religious minorities in a canton.9
In order to analyze the data we decided to use a Fuzzy Set QCA, which
combines a qualitative and quantitative approach. The three main argu-
ments for this mixed method are as follows: (1) The aim of a QCA is
to find causal conditions, called necessary and sufficient conditions. All
hypotheses can be formulated as such conditions for liberal or restrictive
rules for religious recognition (e.g., impending popular votes make
parliaments establish restrictive rules for the recognition of religious
minorities). (2) In particular, combinations of explanations are taken into
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account, sometimes called “complex causation” (Befani, Ledermann, and
Sager 2007, 173). (3) The deep knowledge of every case that can be
achieved by studying the protocols of the parliamentary debates allows
for a well-grounded coding of the variables.
The Fuzzy Sets version of a QCA has been chosen because it allows a
more precise coding. In a standard QCA, the coding is only binary. In the
Fuzzy Set version, all values between zero and one including the critical
0.5 point of “maximum ambiguity” are possible (Ragin 2000, 8).
Attributes that are coded with a value under 0.5 are called absent
(i.e., they are more “out” of the group), with values over 0.5 counted as
present (i.e., they are more “in” the group).
We aim to explain the variance of the rules for religious recognition in
the different Swiss cantons. Therefore, an index for the extent of liberality
of these rules has to be developed. To make the index Fs-QCA compati-
ble, it will be coded between zero and one. Values under 0.5 will be inter-
preted as restrictive, values over 0.5 as liberal. Zero is given to the cantons
that do not have any rule for the recognition of new religious communities,
even though they have discussed it. If the rules for recognition are limited
to Christians and Jews, the variable takes the value 0.2. Some cantons
feature a two-step procedure of recognition: first, the executive checks
whether the religious minority applying for recognition fulfils the criteria
determined by law. Then, if the criteria are fulfilled, the government
passes the request on to the parliament that decides whether or not the
minority should be recognized. If a two-stage procedure is required, the
canton is coded 0.4. A total of five cantons are categorized as restrictive
or rather restrictive. The more liberal values from 0.6 upward are given
to the other eight cantons. The value 0.6 means that the constitution expli-
citly allows for a new law to recognize a religious community. Most
cantons in our data are rather liberal and chose rules that are coded 0.8
or even 1. The significant difference between these cantons and those
with lower values is that there is no necessity of a new law to recognize
another religious community. In these cantons, a simple parliament
decision (“Beschluss”) is enough to award a symbolic (0.8), or official
(1) recognition by public law. This is a rather liberal regulation as referen-
dums can generally only be initiated against laws and not against simple
decisions.10
In our analysis, we have four explanatory factors. The threat of an
impending popular vote is measured by counting the corresponding state-
ments in parliament. The database consists of the parliamentary protocols.
The impending popular vote is coded as a present factor if MPs mention
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that the people might veto a law that is too liberal more than twice in a
parliamentary debate; otherwise it is coded as an absent factor. More
than four references to an impending popular vote mean a full present
factor that is coded as one. These thresholds correspond to the idea that
a real discussion begins with more than two references to a topic. If
only one or two MPs mention the issue, they are probably alone in their
opinion and cannot greatly impact the result of the parliamentary
process. As can be seen from Table 4, we observed only “no reference,”
“one,” or “more than four references,” to direct democracy. This supports
the assumption that a real discussion starts with more than two or three
MPs referring to the issue.11
How often the parliament embedded a liberalization of recognition rules
into a broader bill can be easily observed. A total revision of a cantonal
constitution that includes the new rules for recognition is coded as one.
If the only part of the constitution that is changed is that which regulates
the relation between the state and religious minorities, the case is coded as
zero. The role Muslim minorities played in the parliamentary debate are
also measured by counting the references to this issue by the members
of the cantonal parliaments. The strength of the right-wing party in parlia-
ment is measured by the share of votes of the SVP in the last cantonal
elections. It is argued that the SVP needs a critical strength that enables
the party to threaten a popular vote. If it is just a small party in a
Table 4. Cases and fuzzy values
Canton Year
Total
revision SVP
dd
debate
Islam
debate
Index of
recognition
ZH 2005 1 1 1 1 0
SG 2001 1 0.8 0.2 0.2 0
SZ 1992 0 0.7 0.2 0.2 0
BL 1984 0 0.3 1 1 0.2
BE 1990 0 1 0.2 1 0.4
GR 2003 1 0.8 0 0 0.6
BS 2005 1 0.3 0.2 1 0.8
VD 2002 1 0.3 0 1 0.8
FR 1982 0 0.2 0.2 0 0.8
GL 1988 1 1 0 0 1
AG 1980 1 0.4 0.2 0.2 1
SH 2004 1 1 0 0.2 1
LU 2007 1 0.7 0.2 1 1
Notes: ZH = Zurich, SG = St. Gallen; SZ = Schwyz; BL = Baselland; BE = Bern; GR = Graubünden;
BS = Basel-Stadt; VD = Vaud; FR = Fribourg; GL = Glarus; AG =Aargau; SH = Schaffhausen;
LU = Luzern.
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canton, such as before its rise in the 1990s (Kriesi et al. 2005), it is not
sufficiently supported by the people and is coded as an absent factor.12
Table 4 shows the 13 cantons and their fuzzy values in the different
conditions.
3.3.2. Results
There are two important steps in a QCA. The first step is to scan the data
for necessary conditions, the second to look for sufficient conditions. Both
results will be presented in this paragraph. In QCA-language, a condition
written in all-lower-case characters like “totalrevision” indicates the
absence of the attribute, while a condition written in all-upper-case char-
acters like “TOTALREVISION” indicates the presence of the attribute. As
can be seen from Table 5, there is one necessary condition for liberal
rules, which achieves a consistency (0.92) that is sufficiently high
(Schneider and Wagemann 2007, 234). The absence of “dddebate” is
necessary for liberal rules, which means that such rules could only be
passed by the cantonal parliaments if there had been no debate on the
risk of a popular vote. Two further conditions have relatively high consist-
ency values but they are too low to be called necessary. It becomes
obvious, though, that it is difficult to pass liberal rules as a separate
piece of legislation not embedded in a total revision. It is also difficult
to pass liberal rules when a strong SVP is present.
In the next step, the sufficient conditions are analyzed. Here, the
combinations of conditions are important; they are called paths in
Table 5. Necessary conditions for liberal and restrictive rules for recognition
Liberal rules for
recognition
Restrictive rules for
recognition
Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage
TOTALREVISION 0.82 0.69 0.52 0.31
DDDEBATE 0.34 0.47 0.69 0.67
SVP 0.67 0.60 0.81 0.52
ISLAMDEBATE 0.47 0.53 0.59 0.47
totalrevision 0.18 0.35 0.48 0.65
dddebate 0.92 0.73 0.59 0.33
svp 0.46 0.78 0.37 0.44
islamdebate 0.53 0.65 0.41 0.35
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QCA-language. By means of the fsQCA program’s truth table algorithm,
we find those paths that are sufficient for liberal or restrictive rules,
respectively. The truth tables can be found in the Appendix of this
article. At this point, only the results shall be presented.
Table 6 shows the two paths that lead to liberal rules for recognition.
Liberal rules were passed if they were embedded in a total revision and
no debate on the risk of direct democracy took place. Additionally,
either the SVP was only weakly represented or Islam was an issue in
the parliamentary debate. Only the last point does not meet our expec-
tations and seems surprising. Apart from this, all hypotheses and also
the assumed interactions can be supported by this result.
Regarding restrictive rules for recognition, we find three paths that can
be simplified into two. This reduced version can be read as follows:
restrictive rules for recognition were passed either if there was a debate
on the risk of a popular vote and on Islam (path 1), or if the bill was
not embedded in a total revision, the SVP was strong, and there had
been no debate on the risk of a popular vote (path 2). Again, these
results support our hypotheses, including the interaction hypothesis. The
debate on direct democracy appears as a present and an absent factor,
which seems inconsistent. In fact, this is a specialty of the applied
method. As all cases in which there was a debate on direct democracy
are represented in the first path already, debates about direct democracy
appear as an absent attribute in the second path.
Altogether, we could support the hypothesis that an impending popular
vote leads to restrictive rules for recognition. The absence of such a debate
is nearly necessary for liberal rules, and the factor impending popular vote
appeared in one path as sufficient for restrictive rules. We could also show
that total constitutional revision is important for implementing liberal rules
for recognition. All rules that were distinctly liberal have been embedded
Table 6. Sufficient conditions for liberal rules for recognition
Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency
TOTAL REVISION
*svp*dddebate +
0.33 0.08 0.92
TOTAL REVISION
*dddebate* ISLDEBATE
0.37 0.12 0.87
coverage: 0.45 Reduced: TOT*ddd (svp + ISL) INDEX
consistency: 0.89
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in a total revision. It is a present attribute in both sufficient paths for liberal
rules and an absent attribute in one of the paths for restrictive rules. It
seems that a total revision of a cantonal constitution provides a good
opportunity either to change outdated regulations, or to pass the new
law through the popular vote. A strong SVP is close to a necessary con-
dition for restrictive rules for recognition, and from the parliamentary
debates it can be seen that it was always this right-wing party that
opposed the liberal laws. Since the SVP is an absent factor in the sufficient
path for liberal rules and a present factor in the path for restrictive rules
this finding can also be supported by the QCA.
The situation is different where Muslim minorities are concerned. Unlike
the other hypotheses, this one cannot be confirmed unequivocally by the
QCA. On the one hand, the presence of Muslim minority-related arguments
in combination with a debate on direct democracy is sufficient for restrictive
rules. On the other hand, this presence is also sufficient in one of the paths
leading to liberal rules. However, this supports the hypothesized indirect
effect of popular votes. If the parliament does not fear a popular vote,
then the Muslim factor does not lead to restrictive rules. If there is the
risk of a referendum, the parliament decides for restrictive rules fearing
that voters will not agree to a law that is liberal toward Muslims.
With respect to the embedding-hypothesis, there are two outliers. The
cantons of Zurich and St. Gallen (1982, 2003) both faced a total revision
of their constitution, and neither included liberal rules for recognition.
Looking at Zurich, this can be explained by the two former attempts to
liberalize laws regarding religious minorities, which both failed at the
polls. Strong direct democracy was a significant reason why they did
not try again in the total revision. The case of St. Gallen is more difficult
to explain because the protocols do not exactly show which arguments led
to the restrictive rules. However, a working group involved in the political
Table 7. Sufficient conditions for restrictive rules for recognition
Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency
totalrevision*SVP*dddebate + 0.28 0.24 0.88
totalrevision*svp*DDDEBATE*
ISLDEBATE +
0.17 0.13 1.00
TOTALREVISION*SVP*
DDDEBATE*ISLDEBATE
0.26 0.26 0.78
coverage: 0.67 Reduced: DDD*ISL + tot*SVP*ddd index
consistency: 0.86
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process of developing the new constitution makes one remark that indi-
cates that the risk of losing at the polls had been a relevant factor. This
working group advises a “cautious proceeding” regarding the “people’s
opinion” (final report of the working group 1 “Cantonal system”, 8
November 1989, Cantonal Archive St. Gallen), with reference to the lib-
eralization of the rules for recognition.
4. DISCUSSION
Our central hypothesis is that the negative effects of direct democracy
chiefly occur when a given policy is intended to affect out-groups such
as Muslim minorities. By contrast, in-group minorities fare well in both
the representative and the direct democratic arena. To be more specific,
direct negative effects on Muslims are expected to be limited to
member states with a more conservative electorate. Regarding indirect
effects, legislators might be able to avoid negative effects on Muslims
by embedding a critical law in a broader ballot measure.
To examine the direct effects of direct democracy, we investigated 34
popular votes all aiming at extending the rights of religious minorities.
Five out of these 34 bills were rejected by the voters, that is, in five
cases negative direct effects are observable, which is a comparatively
low number. All of the rejected cases implicitly included the extension
of Muslim rights. However, there are 18 bills also extending the rights
of the Muslim minority that were approved by the voters. Bivariate corre-
lation analyses of the 23 bills including Muslim rights showed that the
electorates in the cantons where the proposals were rejected are more con-
servative than in the other referendums. A review of the newspaper articles
concerning the referendums showed that in two out of the five rejected
cases, populist right-wing parties heavily mobilized against Muslims. In
the campaign preceding another defeated referendum, the political right
mobilized against immigrants who could be considered as another promi-
nent out-group. Since a close relationship between the arguments of the
political parties and the voters’ arguments has been shown to exist
(Selb et al. 2009; Milic 2008), we assume that Muslims and foreigners
played a decisive role for the voters. In all the other 30 cases,
out-groups were not a salient issue during the campaign. The empirical
evidence therefore supports our expectations.
Turning to the indirect effects, the analysis of the parliamentary debates
reveals that a combination of fearing a popular vote, and a debate about
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Muslim minorities, leads to more restrictive minority rights. This means
that Muslim minorities are excluded from those rights. It seems that poten-
tial out-group minorities are discriminated against not only by direct
effects, but also by indirect effects. Interestingly, parliaments nevertheless
develop strategies to enforce their interests, such as embedding liberal
rules for recognition in total revisions. In such a large bundle of issues,
the political actors’ attention in the referendum campaign might be dis-
tracted from the rules for recognition of religious minorities. Instead, the
issues under discussion seem to be positively evaluated by the voters,
boosting the support of the whole package including minority rights.
Even though total revisions of constitutions do not occur very often,
this result might be an interesting advice for legislators, since unflavored
regulations can also be hidden in a group of other measures or within a
revision of a complex law.
The empirical findings of our study corroborate the theoretical expec-
tations of many political scientists. Direct democracy has negative
effects on minority rights. However, these effects are limited to out-
group minorities. Ironically, those are the social groups that are most in
need of support by the state, because they suffer from (latent) intolerance
by the majority. However, direct democracy has not only a downside for
these minorities. All issues and bills analyzed in this article attempted to
change the status quo by extending the rights of religious minorities. This
is not due to coincidence or selection bias; there are simply no cases
aiming at restricting them at the cantonal level. In other words, when
there were negative effects of direct democracy for religious minorities
in Switzerland, they always took the form of a status-quo bias, i.e., an inhi-
bition of the extension of minority rights — at least during the period
investigated here.13 Direct democracies never brought about a restriction
of the status quo. This is in line with the findings of Vatter and Danaci
(2010) that analyzed direct effects of direct democracy on various social
minorities in Switzerland and found that the negative effects of direct
democracy are confined to bills that aim at the extension of minority
rights. Regarding indirect effects, embedding religious rights for out-
group minorities in total revisions of the cantonal constitution seems to
be a promising means of protecting minority rights.
Turning to popular votes, there are very few negative direct effects of
direct democracy and even fewer effects that are obviously due to intoler-
ance towards religious minorities. Yet, we might more frequently observe
popular votes in the future in which Muslims play a significant role. One
recent example is the initiative to ban the construction of minarets in
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Switzerland, which took place at the federal level on November 29, 2009,
and was accepted by 57.5 percent of the voters.14 As a consequence, no
more minarets may be built. Since this study focused on religious minorities
in Switzerland, future research could develop the topic further by placing
other minority groups on the in- and out-group continuum, and could
look at how they fare at the polls. For instance, the in- or out-group potential
of homosexuals, whose rights are limited by direct democracy in United
States-member states (Tolbert and Smith 2006, 32) but are supported by
voters in Switzerland (Vatter and Danaci 2010), would be an interesting
puzzle to tackle.
NOTES
1. At least in most cases. Of course, there are possibilities to limit majority rule by additional
hurdles or qualified majorities.
2. For a more detailed description of religious communities in Switzerland see Baumann and Stolz
(2007).
3. In addition, we can expect bills extending the rights of Muslims to show up less frequently in
cantons with a conservative electorate be it due to indirect effects or to a conservative parliament.
4. This period is determined by data availability from the Anneé Politique Suisse. The only four
cantons not represented are the two laicist cantons Neuchâtel and Genève as well as the catholic
cantons Schwyz and Appenzell-Innerrhoden. While laicism explains the absence of popular votes
in the former two cantons, catholic conservatism might be an explanation in the latter two cantons.
5. The only exception is the popular vote in the canton of Zurich 1989. The bill aimed at providing
support by the public administration for Christian or Jewish minorities when it came to identifying
their members living in a given municipality.
6. As for a comparison, there were 146 popular votes on the rights of social minorities taking place
in the Swiss cantons between 1960 and 2007; another 46 took place at the national level (Vatter and
Danaci 2010). These figures do not include total revisions of the constitutions however. Negative
effects were detected in 41 and positive effects in three out of these 193 cases (ibid.)
7. All party data are from the federal Office of Swiss Statistics. Since they are only available from
1971 on, the earlier cases were coded with the results from the first election in the observed period. For
the cases (Nidwalden 1965, Obwalden 1968, Appenzell-Ausserrhoden 1995, and Graubunden 2003)
no cantonal data are available. The results from the national election to the lower chamber are used
instead.
8. They had been collected by an Institution called Année Politiue Suisse. For each case, there were
between 24 and 74 newspaper articles collected.
9. Since 1900, in 19 out of the 26 Swiss cantons, a debate on the rules for recognition occurred at
least once. For 13 of these cantons the relevant protocols of the parliamentary debate could be
obtained. In cantons, where more than one debate on the rules for recognition took place, the latest
one has been included in the analysis. For further information on all relevant debates consult
Christmann (2010).
10. Solely in special cases that are defined in the constitution, referendums can be initiated against
decisions.
11. References to a referendum threat were only counted if they were mentioned regarding the
specific regulations concerning religious minorities. This is especially important for the debates on
total revisions where only those debates have been included that referred to recognition rules for
religious minorities.
12. The factor is coded as absent, if the share of votes is under 19.2% which is the share of votes of
the SVP in Lucerne. There is a big gap to the next minor value of 14.5% in Aargau. This threshold lies
in the middle category of an overview of the vote percentages of the SVP at Kriesi et al. (2005, 5).
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13. Of course, the Anti-Minaret-Initiative, approved in November 2009 by a majority of Swiss
voters, restricted the rights of Muslims by prohibiting the construction of Minarets in Switzerland.
Since it was a vote on the federal level and since it took place after the end of our data period it
has not been taken into account in the present article.
14. Thus, we can observe a negative direct effect of direct democracy here, too. In contrast to the
cantonal cases analyzed in this study, however, the status quo did not remain but existing rights were
abolished.
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APPENDIX
Table A. Truth table for liberal rules for recognition
totalrevision SVP dddebate isldebate number index consist
1 0 0 1 2 1 0.90
1 1 0 1 1 1 0.89
1 0 0 0 1 1 0.80
1 1 0 0 4 0 0.74
0 0 0 0 1 0 0.73
0 1 0 1 1 0 0.40
1 1 1 1 1 0 0.33
0 1 0 0 1 0 0.22
0 0 1 1 1 0 0.22
Table B. Truth table for restrictive rules for recognition
totalrevision SVP dddebate isldebate number index consist
1 0 0 1 2 1 0.90
1 1 0 1 1 1 0.89
1 0 0 0 1 1 0.80
1 1 0 0 4 0 0.74
0 0 0 0 1 0 0.73
0 1 0 1 1 0 0.40
1 1 1 1 1 0 0.33
0 1 0 0 1 0 0.22
0 0 1 1 1 0 0.22
Table C. Coding of the strength of the SVP
SVP
Kanton Share of Votes in % Fuzzy-Values
ZH 33.9 1
SG 22.6 0.8
SZ 20.9 0.7
BL 10.8 0.3
BE 32.3 1
GR 24 0.8
BS 11.5 0.3
VD 11.9 0.3
FR 6.5 0.2
GL 27.1 1
AG 14.5 0.4
SH 37.5 1
LU 19.2 0.7
Notes: Ladner 2003, Homepages of the cantons.
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